

## DEFINING MORAL TERMS IN *WORKS AND DAYS*

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That words which later signify abstract moral ideas or internal moral states must be cautiously defined from context in archaic Greek is a commonly acknowledged fact demonstrated again by a recent study of *δίκη* in Hesiod.<sup>1</sup> Against the instinctive and more orthodox feeling of others<sup>2</sup> it is suggested that *δίκη* in *Works and Days* does not denote "justice" but always the more limited and objective idea of "settlement" or "legal process." These definitions are believed to arise out of the second of two proposed Homeric meanings for *δίκη*, "characteristic" and "settlement." In addition, *δίκαιος*, whose development is thought to take place separately from that of *δίκη* itself, is limited in Hesiod, according to this analysis, to the meanings "behaving properly" (derived from "characteristic") and "peaceful," "law-abiding" (derived from "settlement").

These conclusions are based on the examination of contexts intentionally restricted to the immediate phrases in which *δίκη* is found in *Works and Days*, and it is this narrow treatment of context that, in the case of Hesiod, must be questioned. Although we cannot, of course, expect to find generic or formal definitions of terms in Hesiod's text, it seems important to point out that some passages, like the naming of the Muses (*Th.* 63–79)<sup>3</sup> and the glosses on the names of Epimetheus (*WD* 89) and Pandora (*WD* 81–82), offer clear, if simple, examples of interest on Hesiod's part in the "rightness" of names that is definitional

<sup>1</sup> M. Gagarin, "Dikē in the *Works and Days*," *CP* 68 (1973) 81–94.

<sup>2</sup> E.g., W. Jaeger, *Paideia* I (New York 1945) 62 ff., F. Solmsen, *Hesiod and Aeschylus* (Ithaca 1949) 86–100, J. P. Vernant, *Mythe et Pensée chez les Grecs* (Paris 1969) 19–46, L. Pearson, *Popular Ethics in Ancient Greece* (Stanford 1962) 81–83, H. Lloyd-Jones, *The Justice of Zeus* (Berkeley 1971) 35–36.

<sup>3</sup> See Hesiod, *Theogony*, ed. M. L. West (Oxford 1966) 32, note 2 especially.

in some sense. The possible importance of such wordplay as a conceptual tool is suggested by the proem of *Works and Days* (1-10). These lines seem to epitomize the vital tension in the poem as a whole between cyclical and progressive views of life by, on the one hand, stressing structural or phonetic balance and repetition in their description of human affairs, e.g.,


ῥέα μὲν γὰρ βριάει, ῥέα δὲ βριάοντα χαλέπτει,  
 ῥεῖα δ' ἀρίζηλον μινύθει καὶ ἄδηλον αἶξει,  
 ῥεῖα δέ τ' ἰθύνει σκολιὸν καὶ ἀγήνορα κάρφει  
 Ζεὺς ὑψιβρεμέτης (5-8)

and, on the other, allowing Zeus, who controls this balance, to appear in a wholly asymmetric sequence of discrete cases (*Δία, Διός, Ζεὺς, τύννη*). The suggestion of Deichgräber who, among others, has discussed these extraordinary lines, is that *δίκη* itself can be "etymologized" by *Διός*.<sup>4</sup> Whether we accept this view or not, the passage shows convincingly that Hesiod is capable of exotic and provocative wordplays which depend upon considerable intentionality in his use of individual words. What I shall propose here is that Hesiod's instinctive interest in such stylistic and, I believe, conceptual language games and in the rudimentary kind of definition that they entail leads him to extend the concrete or traditional meanings of two of his most important moral words, *δίκη* and *αἰδώς*, by drawing attention to semantic contradictions that use of them may involve. This self-conscious effort to manipulate meaning, like other oblique devices in the text whose effect is similar, is incompatible with attempts to study such vocabulary in *Works and Days* by mere random sampling. I shall try to suggest further that in his treatment of *δίκη* and *αἰδώς* Hesiod is experimenting with a distinction between the common value of these words in society and their value to an individual of proper sensibilities, a distinction that, however primitively made, gives Hesiod significantly more modern moral views than those found in Homer.

Much of what Hesiod says about *δίκη* in the so-called sermon on *δίκη* (*WD* 213-85), where the word itself and related words occur twenty-eight times, is clearly designed to elicit an imaginative as well as a literal response. Thus, *δίκη* is described as a source of peace and

<sup>4</sup> K. Deichgräber, *ZVS* 70 (1952) 19-28. For a list of "etymologies" and wordplays in Hesiod see O. Lendle, *Die Pandorasage bei Hesiod* (Würzburg 1957) 119-20.

prosperity to the community (225-37), and is twice movingly personified (220-24; 256-62). It serves as a summary moral for the fable of animal *βίη* (202-12) and as an antithesis to *ὑβρις* and *σχέτλια ἔργα* (238-39). These last points, particularly, are in agreement with Hesiod's regular practice, since, as Blusch<sup>5</sup> notes in his recent study of the vocabulary in this text, Hesiod regularly uses direct and implied antitheses to develop his ideas and enlarge the capacity of his language. These broader elements of context cannot therefore be ignored in assessing Hesiod's use of *δίκη*. But a less obvious and perhaps more sophisticated extension of the meaning of *δίκη* is suggested by the structure of the passage as a whole, which, if we include the preceding fable, gives evidence of a clear design:



This structure shows at the least that Hesiod's treatment of *δίκη* is a conceptual one, not merely a collection of random aphorisms. Each apostrophe is at once followed by a highly descriptive presentation of *δίκη* that culminates in an account of the punishment Zeus will inflict for abuse of *δίκη*. Accordingly *δίκη* appears as simply divine "punishment" at 239. This progression from the description of human *δίκη* to

<sup>5</sup> J. Blusch, *Formen und Inhalt von Hesiods Individuellen Denken* (Bonn 1970) 64-78.

punishment by divine *δίκη* can only mean, I believe, that the way in which men use *δίκη* toward one another will determine what kind of *δίκη* they will ultimately receive from the gods. Human *δίκη* is thus both sustained by, and contrasted with, divine *δίκη*. At the same time, however, this comparison is enclosed by an equally strong distinction between *δίκη* as it exists among men and the absence of *δίκη* among animals. In effect, all classes of beings are defined by their relationship to *δίκη*: it is perfect and ever present for Zeus and his helpers, endangered but possible among men, nonexistent in the animal world. Most important, for our purposes, the chiasmic parallelism of animal fable/apostrophe (202–13) and apostrophe/animal lack of *δίκη* (275–80) suggests that Hesiod is balancing a vague but, perhaps, intentionally provocative<sup>6</sup> use of *δίκη* with one that fulfills or clarifies his meaning. At 213 *δίκη* offers merely an implied antithesis to animal *βίη*; when it recurs at 278 in a structurally similar position after the second apostrophe to Perses the antithesis is fully developed. Its use in 278 may not simply restate the animal theme, therefore, but conclude the passage with an encompassing and, against ordinary usage, radical revaluation of *δίκη* for which the intervening sections of the sermon have served to prepare us.

The structure of Hesiod's sermon on *δίκη* thus suggests a purposeful design by which the potential contexts of *δίκη* are explored and extended. The personal intrusion of Hesiod at 270–72 now has the appearance of a gratuitous addition to his overall scheme, but it is in these lines, I believe, that he gives us his most arresting and linguistically self-conscious statement on *δίκη*:

νῦν δὲ ἐγὼ μήτ' αὐτὸς ἐν ἀνθρώποισι δίκαιος  
 εἶην μήτ' ἐμὸς υἱός, ἐπεὶ κακὸν ἄνδρα δίκαιον  
 ἔμμεναι, εἰ μείζω γε δίκην ἀδικώτερος ἔξει.

It is, perhaps, possible to regard the juxtaposition here of *δίκη* and *δίκαιος* as simply an assertion of scrupulous feeling on Hesiod's part but, given the awesome personification of *δίκη* in the immediately preceding text, this exceptionally material, limited use of *δίκη* as compared to the man who is *δίκαιος*—particularly in the phonetic pairing

<sup>6</sup> The importance of indeterminate contexts for extension of meaning is stressed by K. Kumaniecki, "The Structure of Hesiod's *Works and Days*," *BICS* 10 (1963) 83, in discussing the use of *βίη* in 202–12.

*δίκη*ν ἀδικώτερος—seems both incongruous and ironic. The point of such irony would be, simply, that the difference in meaning between *δίκαιος* and its obvious "etymology" in *δίκη* is one which, in the poet's opinion, ought not to exist. This interpretation can be reinforced by the evidence for *δίκη* and *δίκαιος* with which Gagarin has now provided us. If "settlement" and "characteristic" are in fact the concrete meanings of *δίκη* in the Homeric texts, it is clear that *δίκαιος* is regularly used even there in more abstract and suggestive ways than *δίκη*: Homer calls Cheiron *δικαιοτάτος Κενταύρων* (*Il.* 11.832); Agamemnon is told by Odysseus to be *δικαιότερος καὶ ἐπ' ἄλλῳ* in the future (*Il.* 19.181); Odysseus says that it is not *καλόν* or *δίκαιον* to harm a guest (*Od.* 20.294). The same conclusion can readily be drawn for Hesiod as well when, for example, the race of heroes is called *δικαιότερον καὶ ἄρειον* (*WD* 158) or when the Iron Age is condemned for its lack of proper regard for the man who is *εὐόρκος, δίκαιος, or ἀγαθός* (*WD* 190–91). The origin of this difference in moral quality between typical uses of *δίκη* and typical uses of *δίκαιος* must lie in the fact that *δίκη* is, as Gagarin shows, traditionally used to describe relatively concrete and visible states or events essentially as they occur in society, whereas *δίκαιος* is used largely to describe particular beings as they embody an intangible quality which makes them *δίκαιος*. Inevitably, therefore, *δίκαιος* looks to something that is relatively subjective, a matter of attitude, and as a consequence it can more easily be generalized to a variety of situations in which *δίκη* itself, as a concrete social phenomenon, has no inherent part.

If Hesiod is not simply allowing a radical discontinuity between *δίκη* and *δίκαιος* in these lines<sup>7</sup> but intends through the potential irony of the juxtaposition to suggest that these contradictory meanings ought somehow to be reconciled, the choice he would have us make is clear: it is *δίκη* that must be made to incorporate the values of the man who is *δίκαιος* and therefore circumspect and proper in his behavior in many ways, not simply in matters of legal process. Through this implied transference of meaning from *δίκαιος* to *δίκη*, as well as the sermon as a whole, it becomes possible for Hesiod to say with some force that animals lack *δίκη*. They do so not for the obvious reason that they fail to live by a legal system, but because they lack those qualities of the

<sup>7</sup> As Gagarin (above, note 1) 93 implies.

δίκαιος man which Hesiod now suggests are, or ought to be, implicit in δίκη itself. From this the sermon on δίκη can be seen as a statement that not only universalizes the importance of δίκη beyond anything that can be construed as “settlement,” but as one that tries to extend and color the concrete meaning of δίκη with what we would call subjective values. In a very limited but important way, therefore, δίκη in *Works and Days* may look forward to the capacity of moral words like δικαιοσύνη and ἀρετή in later Greek to designate interior moral qualities independently of the visible social behavior that they also name.

This reading of Hesiodic δίκη and of Hesiod’s interest in the incongruous properties of δίκη and δίκαιος as words whose linguistic forms call for a compatibility not there in substance cannot be taken further on its own merits. What I shall try to show now is that a somewhat comparable play on meanings, which may obliquely help to validate this interpretation of δίκη, occurs in the vexed lines about αἰδώς at 317–20 in *Works and Days*:

αἰδώς δ’ οὐκ ἀγαθὴ κεχρημένον ἄνδρα κομίζει,  
αἰδώς, ἣ τ’ ἄνδρας μέγα σίνεται ἡδ’ ὀνίνησιν·  
αἰδώς τοι πρὸς ἀνολβίῃ, θάρσος δὲ πρὸς ὄλβῳ.  
χρήματα δ’ οὐχ ἀρπακτά, θεόσδοτα πολλὸν ἀμείνω.

The usual meaning of αἰδώς in early Greek is doubtless “shame” in the sense of “awe,” not “disgrace.”<sup>8</sup> Thus, to cite a particularly clear example, Homer tells us at *Iliad* 15.657 that αἰδώς and δέος kept the Greeks from yielding to panic. In some instances, however—*Il.* 8.228, αἰδώς, Ἀργεῖοι, κάκ’ ἐλέγχεα, εἶδος ἀγῆτοί (also *Il.* 15.502, 16.422), *Il.* 17.336, αἰδώς μὲν νῦν ἦδε γ’ ἀρηϊφίλων ὑπ’ Ἀχαιῶν / Ἴλιον εἰσαναβῆναι ἀναλκείησι δαμέντας, *Od.* 3.24, αἰδώς δ’ αὖ νέον ἄνδρα γεραίτερον ἐξέρεεσθαι—αἰδώς possesses, as *LSJ* rightly states, a more concrete meaning: “that which causes shame.” In the *Lexikon des frühgriechischen Epos*, however, Snell interprets these phrases as periphrases of nonconcrete uses of αἰδώς: “man muss sich scheuen.”<sup>9</sup> While it is true that these uses of αἰδώς might imply to the Greek

<sup>8</sup> *Lfgre* s.v. αἰδώς; W. Verdenius, “ΑΙΔΩΣ bei Homer,” *Mnemosyne* 3.12 (1944) 47–60. N. v. Erffa, *ΑΙΔΩΣ und verwandte Begriffe* (Leipzig 1937), treats the original value as “shame” (“Scheu”) and takes *Od.* 17.578, *Od.* 3.24, and *WD* 317 as exhibiting a negative later value.

<sup>9</sup> A phrase taken from Verdenius, p. 55, who offers no explanation for this reading.

speaker an understood *ἐμοί* or *ἡμῖν*, by themselves they appear to let *αἰδώς* stand in a way that cannot clearly be referred to the feelings of a particular human agent. This relatively concrete or objective meaning cannot be isolated, of course, from personally felt "shame," but, particularly in view of the use of *αἰδώς* as "genitals" at *Iliad* 2.262 and 22.75, it may be pointed out that Greek words for "blame" and "shame" fall together more readily than comparable words in English, a pattern of usage that may reflect the unusual importance of these ideas in archaic Greek society. Examples that show the ambiguity of "blame" and "shame" are the following:

- (1) ὦ φίλοι, ἄνδρες ἔστε, καὶ αἰδῶ θέσθ' ἐνὶ θυμῷ (*Il.* 15.561)
- (2) οὐ γάρ τις νέμεσις φυγέειν κακόν (*Il.* 14.80)
- (3) αἰδώς μὲν νῦν ἦδε γ' ἀρηϊφίλων ὑπ' Ἀχαιῶν  
"Ἴλιον εἰσαναβῆναι (*Il.* 17.336-37)
- (4) ἀλλ' ἐν φρεσὶ θέσθε ἕκαστος / αἰδῶ καὶ νέμεσιν (*Il.* 13.121-22)
- (5) ὅς ῥ' ἤδη νέμεσιν τε καὶ αἴσχεα πόλλ' ἀνθρώπων (*Il.* 6.351)
- (6) ἀλλὰ τις ἀθανάτων παῦσεν χόλον, ὅς ῥ' ἐνὶ θυμῷ  
δήμου θῆκε φάτιν καὶ ὀνειδέα πόλλ' ἀνθρώπων (*Il.* 9.459-60)

The typical context for "shame" words is that of (1), in which *αἰδώς* is clearly a state of feeling. In contrast, the most typical context of *νέμεσις* is that of (2), in which *νέμεσις*, lacking a personal referent, most readily denotes external "blame"—the specific reproach which others will address to a man for his acts. But these contexts are occasionally interchangeable. In (3) *αἰδώς* uses, as I have just said, a context indistinguishable from that of *νέμεσις* in (2), and in this instance it may be taken to fall within the perspective that normally allows *νέμεσις* to be felt as "blame." Conversely, (4) places *νέμεσις* in a context exactly like that of *αἰδώς* in (1), and this substitution seems to be repeated for *νέμεσις* in (5) and for *ὀνειδος*, another ordinarily external "blame" word, as well as the unmistakably external *φάτις*, in (6).

What I suggest is that this ambivalent use of *αἰδώς* as both "blame" and "shame" is perceived by Hesiod as material for a paradoxical wordplay of the type we have just explicated for *δίκη/δίκαιος*. If so, this wordplay will, I believe, explain the disputed lines on *αἰδώς* at 317-20, where it is difficult to know whether *αἰδώς* is being recommended or rejected,<sup>10</sup> and where the threefold use of *αἰδώς*, like the

<sup>10</sup> For an able treatment of the problem with literature see K. J. McKay, "Ambivalent *ΑΙΔΩΣ* in Hesiod," *AJP* 84 (1963) 17-27.

juxtaposition *δίκη/ἀδικώτερος* earlier, has the tone of an oxymoron. The first of these lines is repeated at *Odyssey* 17.347

*αἰδώς δ' οὐκ ἀγαθὴ κεχρημένῳ ἀνδρὶ παρῆναι*

and the surrounding context unquestionably demonstrates that *αἰδώς* is "not good" for a poor man because it prevents him from getting his share of the meal. It is impossible, however, to apply this simple interpretation, in which *αἰδώς* is taken to mean "false modesty," to Hesiod's statement. In order to do so the substitution of *κομίζει* for *παρῆναι*, as McKay shows,<sup>11</sup> must be taken to make the line flatly sarcastic, since the normally positive connotations<sup>12</sup> of *κομίζω* will otherwise make no sense. That is, "Harmful modesty loves (to his detriment) the company of a poor man." But such heavy sarcasm cannot easily be reconciled with the declaration at 318 that *αἰδώς* helps as well as harms or with the unquestionably positive use of *αἰδώς* at 324, where it is said that in bad times *ἀναιδείη* comes at the heels of *αἰδώς*. It is against common sense, moreover, to attribute casual sarcasm here about *αἰδώς* to the poet who earlier (*WD* 197–200) has identified wicked men as those who lack *αἰδώς*, much less to the obsessively cautious speaker of 724 and following who prescribes the list of ritual observances for daily life. These difficulties are compounded by the awkward transition between lines 319 and 320. If *αἰδώς* is portrayed simply as a feeling of shame that hinders honest work and as a debilitating consequence of poverty, it can only follow that *θάρσος* in 319 is, in this context, a simple "good" to be preferred to *αἰδώς*. Why, then, in 320 the sudden introduction of a warning against goods not *θεόσδοτα*?

I do not believe we can insist on a unilateral rendering of these lines that will prove satisfactory. If they are meant to attack modesty, they scarcely succeed. That they look to a meaning of *αἰδώς* that has nothing to do with the Odyssean proverb is equally unlikely, given the repetition of language from poem to poem and the suitability of the preceding context for this sentiment, i.e., 311: *ἔργον δ' οὐδὲν ὄνειδος*. I suggest, however, that this apparent confusion or doubleness of

<sup>11</sup> Pp. 25–26.

<sup>12</sup> Discussed with examples by A. Hoekstra, "Hésiode, les travaux et les jours, 405–407, 317–319, 21–24. L'élément proverbiale et son adaptation," *Mnemosyne* 4.3 (1950) 103–04.



meaning is precisely Hesiod's point. *Works and Days* 197–200 tells us, beyond question, that *aîdōs* is something of profound religious value for Hesiod, however problematical its intrusion into the day-to-day patterns of life. To a poet of this concern for *aîdōs* the Odyssean version of the proverb is surely unacceptable, since it must make the observance of *aîdōs* a pragmatic, even trivial, matter. In the face of hunger a poor man may have to give up his feelings of *aîdōs* in order to eat, but no one of Hesiod's pious sensibilities can have imagined that such a man genuinely ought to feel no *aîdōs*.<sup>13</sup> He has no *oîkos*, no property, no visible means of support. Hesiod has, moreover, no word for the modern lexicographer's notion of "false modesty;" he can speak only of *aîdōs*. A possible interpretation of *Works and Days* 317–20, therefore, is that the lines record for us an attempt by Hesiod to introduce in a suitable context—that menial work is no disgrace—a traditional proverb on the expedient suppression of *aîdōs* under duress without allowing the implication that the poor man should, in any deeper sense, have no feelings of *aîdōs*.<sup>14</sup> In order to do this Hesiod has, I believe, tried to absorb the simple sequential view of *aîdōs* inherent in the Odyssean proverb—*aîdōs* is bad for the poor, but not for the rich: it is one thing ("shame") that is found to be good under some circumstances, bad under others—into a deeper, nonsequential classification which tries to say that, rightly understood, *aîdōs* can be seen to have a *nature* that is in some respects good, in others bad, and that these alternative aspects of *aîdōs* are present simultaneously whenever *aîdōs* is felt. Such a reading of *aîdōs* is not inappropriate for *Works and Days*. We might compare, for example, the odd use of time in Hesiod's description of the Iron Age where he seems to be attempting to conflate the idea of a fixed sequence of better to worse

<sup>13</sup> On this point cf. T. A. Sinclair, "On *ΑΙΔΩΣ* in Hesiod," *CR* 39 (1925) 147–48.

<sup>14</sup> Both Hoekstra and McKay take a similar position that the proverb is gradually modified, but neither seems to find a way around the difficulties of the passage. Hoekstra's treatment of *aîdōs* as a good throughout, i.e., a decent sense of modesty sometimes misapplied (317) places Hesiod in the awkward position of recommending in some sense the *ἀνολβή* of 319 and still leaves bad *aîdōs* as something the poor man ought not to have, not something from which he is, as in the *Odyssey*, excused. Hoekstra is right, however, to point out that 317 is an oxymoron. McKay's distinction between respect for the station of others as against the rights of others is ingenious but lacks sufficient contextual support. Hesiod's theme in this section is not politics, but the achievement of wealth through work.

men, which will extend the myth of the declining ages, with the more redemptive view, suitable for a poet who is trying to show men the way to prosperity, that the better and worse are coexisting classes of men in the present for some of whom at any rate a decent life is still possible. The most pertinent comparison to this passage, however, is the explicit division of *ἔρις* at the opening of *Works and Days*. Hesiod himself tells us flatly that there are two different *kinds* of *ἔρις*, not one *ἔρις* in two settings. Since these *ἐριδες*, however we are to understand them, are treated in a highly didactic way, it can be argued that this division into kinds is not intended to sort out popular usage but to assert instead that *ἔρις* has an instructive double nature which only the poet has seen. That a similar division into kinds is being tested on other words which in the poet's opinion exhibit doubleness of some sort is not unlikely.

It seems reasonable, therefore, to read the *αἰδώς* passage as an implied division of *αἰδώς* into kinds while recognizing the possibility that this division, like that of *ἔρις*, signals a didactic purpose which allows Hesiod to treat the meaning of *αἰδώς* somewhat prescriptively. My suggestion is that Hesiod is trying to say that, just as *δίκη* in society can be contrasted with a man who is *δίκαιος*, *αἰδώς* in its ordinary social setting can be distinguished from *αἰδώς* as it is perceived by, or embodied in, a man who is truly *αἰδοῖος*. The incongruity here is less acute but nevertheless significant. The social experience of *αἰδώς* in connection with poverty, in particular the unpleasant and unwanted feeling that others are "blaming" a man for his disgrace and the grief and inhibition that may arise from this, are clearly "bad" and even harmful. For the man who is constantly *αἰδοῖος*, on the other hand, the merely imagined experience of such "shame" so motivates him that he will devote himself to incessant work in order to avoid it. This sense of shame associated with a man who is "shameful" to the depths of his personality differs importantly in quality from the simpler reactive shame that "harms." Whereas the latter is immediately dependent on "blame," felt to be ambiguous with "that which causes shame" and, like *δίκη*, to be something socially concrete, the shame of an *αἰδοῖος* man is self-sufficient, constructive and, relative to social "blame," intangible. It is, ideally, a matter of stable attitudes not directly tied to the actions and opinions of others. Shame of this kind is in keeping, I believe, with the spirit of a poet who may look upon agriculture as a

form of religious expression<sup>15</sup> and who throughout *Works and Days* regularly sees in the routine of daily life a constant need for scrupulous piety. A deeper analogy can thus be drawn with *δίκη*. Like *δίκη*, it can be argued, *αἰδώς* defines relationships between men, but it has divine sanction as well and will therefore depart from earth in the last years of the Iron Age (*WD* 197–200), leaving men without defense against evil. For the present, however, just as the *δίκαιος* man who has a profound and scrupulous regard for *δίκη* as a daughter of Zeus can expect to be protected from perverted forms of *δίκη*, the man who is *αἰδοῖος* through his constant regard for *αἰδώς* will have a providential relationship to Zeus that ought to protect him from harmful *αἰδώς*, or "blame," as it exists in the social context.

If this argument is valid, Hesiod's statement about the value of *αἰδώς* need not be a blunt sarcasm, nor an assertion that *αἰδώς* offers the peasant a commendable but awkward virtue.<sup>16</sup> The difficulties of the lines are instead resolvable by a reading that understands *αἰδώς* first as "shame" contingent upon and confused with social "blame," and then as the kind of "shame" that is a deeply and piously held value in a man's life. By introducing *κομίζει* in 317 Hesiod has twisted the Odyssean proverb into a statement that will admit this dual view of *αἰδώς*: "The *αἰδώς* that is bad for a poor man (also) fosters him." He restates this more complex idea in 318: "*αἰδώς* that greatly harms and helps." I take this to mean specifically that, although poverty generally brings "shame" and "blame," the fear of poverty will induce a thoughtful and pious man to become perpetually *αἰδοῖος* and thus, as a practical matter, to devote himself to the work that will keep him out of poverty, irrespective of the reproaches he actually experiences in his dealings with others. If *αἰδώς* in this sense helps enough he will escape poverty and the *αἰδώς* associated with "blame," achieving wealth and *θάρος*. The apparent recommendation of *θάρος* in 319 and the abrupt transition to the warning against goods not *θεόσδοτα* in 320 are then simply a continuation of this sentiment. Not all *αἰδώς*, but the wrong kind of *αἰδώς*—the social "shame" of poverty—will give way for one who is successful to a much more welcome feeling of *θάρος*. But any exercise of *θάρος* that fails to take into account the larger point that

<sup>15</sup> M. Detienne, *Crise agraire et attitude religieuse chez Hésiode* (Brussels 1963) 33–51.

<sup>16</sup> Hoekstra 105.

Hesiod has just made, one which recapitulates the fundamental belief of *Works and Days* that a man's attitude toward wealth and poverty must be rooted in his relationship to Zeus, is wrong and ultimately punishable.<sup>17</sup> The warning of 320 is therefore not irrelevant, but an important qualification that allows *θάπρος* to serve as an alternative to harmful *αἰδώς* without detracting from the praise of helpful *αἰδώς*. All four lines, it should now be clear, are entirely consistent with the wholly positive use of *αἰδώς* in 324.

A general theory of moral definition in Hesiod cannot be drawn from two examples. But I have shown, I hope, that any attempt to understand Hesiod's vocabulary must take into account his desire as a poet to stimulate an imaginative response to the use of thematically significant words, something particularly apparent in the remarkably dense use of *δίκη* in *Works and Days* 213–85. Most important, it must take into account his evident interest in the definitional, or at least didactic, properties of words in themselves as they are subjected to labored and potentially paradoxical usages of the type just examined. The objective study of words through close comparison of immediate contexts has contributed much to our understanding of the implicit values and ideas of early Greece, and the new study of *δίκη* has done so as well. Nevertheless, the limitations of this method in dealing with the text of Hesiod, where the meaning of the words in question is, in some sense, the poet's subject, must be stressed. If I am right in my suggestion that the wordplays involved in Hesiod's use of *δίκη*/*δίκαιος* and *αἰδώς*/*(αἰδοῖος)* recognize in prototype a distinction between social and personal morality—a result, I would add, not of early evolutionary tendencies in Greek popular morality, which in my view remains closely tied to Homeric values until late in the fifth century,<sup>18</sup> but of Hesiod's unusually ascetic personal religion—those limitations are indeed considerable.

<sup>17</sup> McKay 21 sees the ambivalence of *θάπρος*, but, like *αἰδώς*, from the point of view of class consciousness.

<sup>18</sup> See my article, "Phaedra and the Socratic Paradox," *YCS* 22 (1972) 223–38.